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Reciprocity in International
Telecommunications Trade:
A New Trade Barrier?
Sheryl Powers*

INTRODUCTION
United States trade policy is at a cross-roads. Since World War II, the
United States has encouraged expansion of trade through multilateral
negotiations. I Designed to provide each participant with benefits that in
the aggregate correspond to each party's concessions, these negotiations
led to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and produced
an unprecedented era of prosperous international trade. 2
Recent complaints about restricted foreign markets, however, have
caused some legislators to question whether the United States has given
away more than it has received. 3 In the 97th Congress, over 250 bills were
introduced which required or authorized the United States to demand
"reciprocity" from its trading partners. 4 Most bills defined reciprocity as
"equivalent commercial opportunities," 5 which on its face seems a fair
request to make of other nations. But many bills required the United States
to retaliate against non-reciprocating nations by erecting trade barriers in
the United States similar to those in uncooperative nations. 6 This approach
represents a break with traditional United States policy and has created a
continuing controversy in Congress. 7
To those advocating its use, reciprocity legislation is especially appropriate for the telecommunications industry. Only 5 percent of telecommunications equipment manufactured in the United States is exported for
sale in other nations. 8 Trade barriers, loyalty to domestic manufacturers
and the importance of telecommunications to national defense systems
have combined to restrict access to foreign markets in the telecommunications sector. To persuade other nations to increase market access in telecommunications, United States legislators added a requirement of
reciprocity to two proposed bills, S.898 9 and H.R.5158.1 0 This note will
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examine these two bills, concluding that reciprocity is an inappropriate
solution to United States concerns about foreign trade restrictions.
Background of Reciprocity
Reciprocity is not a new concept. Between the two world wars, the United
States applied reciprocity bilaterally, attempting to balance trade with each
nation. The results were disastrous and led to retaliatory trade practices. I'
Against this background, the GATT was formed in 1947 by the United
States and its major trading partners to "maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions." 12 This principle is known
as "global reciprocity." 13 In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress included the
idea of reciprocity as a negotiating objective. 14
Much of the recent controversy over reciprocity has focused on its value
as a formal requirement in United States law versus its value as an informal
objective in trade negotiations. Is Advocates of reciprocity believe that
currently the United States lacks leverage in negotiations because it has
already conceded as much as it can; 16 a threat that United States markets
will close is necessary to persuade other nations to open theirs. Reciprocity
legislation would provide negotiators with a bottom line. 17 As a mere
informal objective, reciprocity gives negotiators neither sanctions nor incentives to induce countries to open their markets. 18 Thus, to provide
leverage to open foreign telecommunications markets, reciprocity and the
authority to retaliate were added to S.898 and H.R.5158.

S.898 § 238 AND H.R.5158 § 267, THE RECIPROCITY PROVISIONS
Both S.898 and H.R 5158 are concerned primarily with deregulation in the
United States telecommunications industry. 19 Reciprocity was added to
these bills partly from a concern that deregulation would result in greater
numbers of foreign firms entering the United States market, 20 especially
since Western Europe and Japan have targeted the telecommunications
industry for major expansion. 21 Protecting United States domestic markets
from foreign expansion may receive support because the telecommunications industry is seen as vital to national security and United States technological competitiveness. 22 The industry is also valuable in purely monetary
terms, as the United States market for telecommunications equipment
alone is worth an estimated $15 billion. 23
Another reason for the addition of reciprocity provisions was the desire
to open foreign markets to United States telecommunications firms. 24 An
estimated 96 percent of foreign telephone operating companies are government owned 25 and purchase their equipment and services by law, regula-
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tion, or custom from local companies. 26 The loyalty to local industry
results from a desire "to safeguard a continuing supply of equipment for
a vital, critical industry ... to add to the country's knowledge of technology, and to provide jobs." 27 In the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, the
United States attempted 28 to include government-owned telecommunications entities in the Government Procurement Code 29 which forbids discrimination on the basis of national origin in government purchasing.
Unfortunately, this attempt failed, hardening the United States' conviction
that new leverage was needed to persuade other nations to open their
0
markets to American telecommunications equipment and services. 3
In addition to government procurement policies, other trade barriers
hamper American exports of telecommunications equipment and services.
For example, many countries allow a foreign firm to establish a local
subsidiary only if the subsidiary is primarily owned by a local partner.
American firms consider such an arrangement disadvantageous because it
entails a loss of control over operations and technology often developed
at great expense. 31 Since the sale of telecommunications equipment and
services often requires the establishment of a local subsidiary, 32 American
firms reluctant to lose control may be precluded from trade with nations
requiring major local ownership. Other countries have prescribed standards for telecommunications services and equipment which, by design or
administration, exclude foreign vendors. 33 The United States Trade Representative's list of barriers to telecommunications, data and information
services 34 illustrates the pervasiveness of foreign trade restrictions in this
industry. 35
S.898 § 238 36 and H.R.5158 § 267 37 authorize the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to apply to foreign telecommunications firms in
the United States the same terms and conditions applied to United States
firms in the foreign firms' "home" nations. Both sections provide that a
foreign country cannot prevent the application of restrictions against its
firms by merely concluding an agreement on telecommunications equipment procurement with the United States. The country must actually
ensure that American firms are granted "reciprocal rights." 38 Reciprocal
rights are defined as the rights granted United States telecommunications
facilities in foreign markets which are reasonably equivalent to those
39
granted foreign enterprises in the United States itself.
Both sections authorize the Secretary of Commerce to monitor the implementation of reciprocity in consultation with the FCC and the Office
of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). 40 The USTR is required
to compile a list of countries that are non-reciprocating. 41 This list will be
used to deny certain telecommunications equipment certification 4 2 or interconnection rights 43 when more than one-half its total value has been
added in a "nonreciprocating" country on the list.
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Although the provisions of the bills are similar, they scrutinize different
aspects of the treatment United States firms receive in foreign countries.
Section 267 imposes on foreign firms the conditions of operation applied to
United States firms abroad while § 238 imposes the conditions of entry
applied to United States firms abroad. 44 Conditions of entry are the restrictions facing firms entering a foreign market for the first time; for example,
obtaining a license to do business in the foreign country. Conditions of
operation are the restrictions facing firms already in the foreign country;
for instance, meeting an additional standard on telecommunications
equipment required only of foreign firms. Obviously, there is some overlap
in these two concepts. It is unclear whether in application either would
result in a noticeable difference from the other.
These sections differ in scope in two additional ways. First, although
both sections 238 and 267 apply the conditions of the foreign nation in
which the foreign telecommunications firm is based, 45 section 267 broadens its application to the conditions of the nation under whose law the
foreign firm's transmissions or services originate, terminate or are regulated. 46 Section 238 contains only the addition of the nation under whose law
the foreign firm was established. 47 Second, section 238 applies to "telecommunications or information services, facilities or equipment," while
section 267 is limited to "telecommunications services or facilities." 48
Thus, although section 238 is broader in its coverage of equipment, section
267 is broader in its coverage of the foreign nations under scrutiny.
Section 238 includes a provision omitted from section 267. The President is authorized to veto FCC decisions for foreign policy reasons after
consulting with Commerce, USTR, and State. 49 Section 267, however,
exempts "services and facilities offered on the effective date of this section," 5 0 while section 238 contains no "grandfather" provision.
Reciprocity Under Fire
Reciprocity has generated many heated controversies since its introduction
in the 97th Congress. Critics have maintained that reciprocity is unsound
economically, is infeasible administratively, and is inconsistent with United States international obligations. Each of these areas will be analyzed
below.
Economic Disadvantages
In §§ 238 and 267, reciprocity is measured on both a bilateral (nation-tonation) and sectoral (market sector-to-market sector) basis. For example,
§§ 238 and 267 would compare Japan's treatment of United States telecommunications facilities with the treatment of Japan's telecommunications
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facilities by the United States, a market sector and nation to nation comparison. Ambassador Brock, the United States Trade Representative, has
opposed bilateral reciprocity because it undermines the multilateral approach to trade inherent in the GATT which is responsible for the current
5
low level of tariffs on trade. 1
Brock and others have also opposed sectoral reciprocity because it ig 7
nores comparative economic advantages between nations. 52 Nations are
not equally efficient at producing every good or service. Therefore, they
have an incentive to export products they produce relatively efficiently and
import products they produce relatively inefficiently. Some critics fear that
sectoral reciprocity may be used to equalize trade between nations in each
product line, thereby impairing the incentive to trade. 5 3 Without this
incentive, the United States could lose leverage in trade negotiations. Sections 238 and 267, however, require only equivalent treatment, not equal
levels of trade in the telecommunications sector. It is unclear whether these
sections would be interpreted as mandating an equal balance in telecommunications trade.
Many commentators have expressed their concern that nations subject
to United States reciprocity restrictions will retaliate.5 4 Opponents of reciprocity in the telecommunications sector have emphasized that the United
States has a trading advantage in this area. As a result, other countries may
be entirely willing to adopt a protectionist approach in the telecommunications field in response to American restrictions. 55 In addition, those with
whom the United States maintains a positive balance of trade, such as the
European Communities, may be quick to adopt reciprocity as their standard to equalize their balance of trade with the United States. 56 If American reciprocity leads to wide-spread adoption of trade restrictions, the
United States would have much to lose as imports and exports account for
approximately one-fifth of the United States gross national product. 57
As critics of reciprocity have noted, the United States has many trade
barriers of its own. 58 An example in the telecommunications field is the
United States ban on foreign ownership of television and radio licenses. 5 9
If the United States were to adopt reciprocity, its own trade barriers would
give other nations reason to demand reciprocity or to retaliate them-

selves. 60
Nations have traditionally been concerned about their relative balances
of trade. Reciprocity proponents have become alarmed at recent United
States deficits and have urged that the United States take serious action to
offset them. 61 In 1981, the United States trade deficit was approximately
$28 billion. The deficit with Japan alone was in the order of $16 billion. 62
Those who advocate reciprocity apparently assume this deficit is due
primarily to open markets in the United States and closed markets abroad.
But several commentators assert that market factors such as interest rates,
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availability of capital, lack of skilled manpower, and research and development opportunities are the predominant reasons for poor United States
63
trade performance.
The United States has recently had high interest rates which resulted in
an influx of foreign investment. 64 In turn, the dollar has been strengthened
vis-a-vis other currencies, making imports relatively inexpensive in the
United States and United States goods relatively expensive abroad. 65 For
example, the dollar is at least 25 percent overvalued in relation to the
Japanese yen. 66 As a result, United States goods are at a competitive
disadvantage in Japan quite apart from the market restrictions commonly
attributed to the Japanese. 67 To state that our $16 billion trade deficit with
Japan is the result of Japanese trade restrictions on United States imports
underestimates the effect of current exchange rates. A United States trade
policy of retaliation against foreign trade restrictions would be ineffective
partly because it ignores the impact of interest and exchange rates as well
as other economic factors on United States trade performance.
Moreover, the United States trade deficit in itself is a misleading indication of overall American competitiveness. For example, trade deficit figures
include only trade in merchandise. When services and investment are also
counted, the 1981 deficit was more than offset, resulting in a surplus of $4.5
billion. 68 Furthermore, the trade deficit reports the overall balance of trade,
not the balance within a particular industry. 69 In the telecommunications
equipment industry, the United States has a trade surplus, 70 with imports
accounting for only 41 percent of American consumption of telecommuni7
cations equipment.
Nevertheless, a positive current account "is not a measure of whether
a given American corporation is able to compete because of the presence
of equitable rules." 72 Despite the positive numbers, many American business people object to the formal trade barriers in foreign countries, especially when firms in those countries have access to markets in the United
States. It is, perhaps, this sense of unfairness, that the United States has
maintained free access to its markets while its trading partners have not,
however accurate the perception may or may not be, that motivates those
demanding reciprocity.
Whether all participants maintain equally open markets or not, international trade has many benefits, even on a unilateral basis. Competition
from imports results in lower prices for United States consumers and may
reduce overall inflation rates. 73 Imports give United States firms access to
foreign technological advances and, according to some United States firms,
push technological development as United States firms strive to compete
with advanced imports. 74 Although banning a foreign product or service
may provide protection for United States companies in the same line, it
may also result in higher prices for domestic companies that use the pro-
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duct or service. Reciprocity may shelter United States firms now competing
with imports only at the cost of United States exporting firms losing
markets abroad if other nations retaliate. Furthermore:
Restrictions on imports reduce other countries' exports and hence the foreign
exchange available to them for importing. Reduced imports mean that someone else's exports eventually will decline. Arguably, in the long run, jobs can
be saved in import competing industries only at the expense of jobs "lost"
in export-competing industries. 75
Reciprocity may carry hidden costs to the entire United States economy.
DISADVANTAGES OF RECIPROCITY
PROVISIONS IN S.898 AND H.R.5158
Broad Powers Granted the FCC
The main provisions of §§ 238 and 267 appear to grant the FCC the power
to replicate any foreign government law or practice which affects the entry
or operation of United States telecommunications companies abroad. 76
This open-ended mandate could include application of foreign antitrust,
tax, environmental, employment, securities, land use, and health and safety laws and regulations. 77 If so applied, §§ 238 and 267 would result in
numerous and possibly contradictory FCC rules mirroring the trade restrictions of other nations. Each foreign nation and each foreign product and
service might require different treatment, depending on the treatment
given United States products and services abroad. Administration of such
a system would be frought with difficulties and would give the FCC
powers not usually accorded regulatory agencies.
Objections have been voiced on the authority granted the FCC in §§ 238
and 267. In each provision, the FCC is given the power to determine the
conditions under which "foreign" telecommunications firms may operate
in the United States. 78 The FCC has indicated that it already has the
authority to scrutinize "foreign carrier reciprocal practices" when reviewing carrier tariffs 79 and determining whether they are in the public interest
under §§ 208, 209, and 210 of the 1934 Communications Act. 8 0 Part of the
FCC's scrutiny includes consideration of terms applied to United States
firms abroad when deciding whether to permit a foreign carrier to enter the
United States market or establish facilities. 81 The FCC, however, welcomed § 238 because the 1934 Act does not explicitly provide for reciprocity authority and the FCC's use of that authority had never been tested in
court. 82 Consequently, the FCC indicated it has exercised its authority
with caution. 83
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Commentators almost universally criticized the amount of discretion
given the FCC by §§ 238 and 267. The major fear was that this provision
would result in an uncoordinated trade policy, 8 4 as the FCC is an independent regulatory agency and therefore not directly subject to Executive
Branch control. 85
Sections 238 and 267 do, however, impose some limits on the FCC's
powers. The Secretary of Commerce would monitor the FCC's implementation of its power, in consultation with the FCC and the USTR, but
without a voice in the FCC's decisions. 86 Section 267(e) requires the FCC
to consult with Commerce, the USTR, State and any other federal officer
designated by the President. 8 7 Nevertheless, the FCC alone decides
whether to impose trade restrictions. Although § 238(d) does grant the
President 45 days to veto FCC decisions, 88 § 267 does not contain a veto
provision. Many critics thought § 267 would interfere with the President's
power to conduct foreign relations "with a unified voice" 89 and to negotiate reductions in foreign trade barriers in the telecommunications sector. 90
Some commentators questioned the constitutionality of § 267 because it
allows the FCC to encroach upon the President's exclusive right to conduct
foreign relations. 91
Other critics questioned the ability and resources of the FCC to handle
the complicated determinations required by §§ 238 and 267, such as discerning the origin of products and services. 92 Finally, one critic noted the
potential conflict with the USTR which was established to coordinate trade
policy. 93 In sum, the consensus was against granting the FCC, an independent regulatory agency, the power to make decisions pregnant with international policy implications.

Over-inclusiveness
A major problem with S.898 and H.R.5158 lies in their definitions of a
"foreign" entity. The broad language would capture what many believe are
United States firms. S.898 § 103(15) stipulates that an "enterprise" or
"entity" is foreign when at least 20 percent of the firm is owned or
controlled by a foreign person. 94 Thus, a firm that was 80 percent American
owned would be categorized as foreign. H.R.5158 § 301(36) follows the 20
percent restriction of S.898 § 103(15). 9 Aside from discouraging joint
ventures which provide a means to exploit foreign technology under at
least partial American control, 96 this definition could impose economically
costly restrictions on companies primarily owned by United States citizens,
whether the firms are located abroad or in the United States. 97 Since the
definitions do not exclude "foreign-owned" firms based in the United
States, 98 §§ 267 and 238 may jeopardize the jobs of United States citizens
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employed by those companies. 99 The costs of implementing §§ 238 and
267 may thus be inadvertently borne by United States citizens.
In addition to catching "innocent" American firms in its net, § 267
ensnares foreign firms from "innocent" nations. In § 267(a)(2), a foreign
firm is granted reciprocity on the terms and conditions United States firms
face not only in the foreign company's home nation, but also in any nation
which receives the foreign company's transmissions. 100 Therefore, a foreign company could confront restrictions based on the trade barriers of a
nation merely receiving its transmissions even though its own home nation
granted United States firms full market access. Not only does this seem
likely to offend nations willing to reduce their trade barriers, but also it
appears to be an ineffective tool against nations receiving transmissions.
If a nation is not seeking access to the United States market, any restriction
the United States places on its neighbors is unlikely to affect its practices.
If it is seeking access, the United States can judge that nation according to
its own barriers without unnecessarily penalizing its cooperative neighbors.
Section 267 and § 238 also demand that foreign nations refrain from
"encouraging" or "condoning" practices of domestic manufacturers inhibiting the sales of United States telecommunications facilities. 101 Although
a nation may grant United States firms market access, this provision may
require it to impose a regulatory scheme on private companies to avoid
"condoning" practices which adversely affect United States firms. It is one
thing to request a nation to implement nondiscrimination in government
procurement but quite another to insist it become the watchdog of private
firms over whom the government may have little legal control. It seems
unlikely such a "request" will obtain the cooperation of foreign nations
which have refrained from imposing regulatory restraints on their telecommunications industries.
A third difficulty occurs in the application of restrictions to "foreign"
firms currently in the United States. Section 267(h) exempts "services and
facilities offered on the effective date of this section" 10 2 but § 238 does not
contain a similar "grandfather" clause. Thus, under § 238, the FCC could
impose restrictions on foreign firms which entered the United States market without prior notice of a reciprocity law. One critic questioned whether the imposition of restraints on such firms would be a taking of property
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 103 Even
if the imposition of a new reciprocity law does not rise to the level of a
taking, it does present difficulties for foreign firms already established in
the United States which would not have entered with prior notice of the
law. These difficulties will probably become the subject of complaints
against the United States by the home countries of those firms.
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Value-added Provisions
The "value-added" provisions of H.R. 5158 and S.898, which allow the
FCC to place restrictions on certain equipment if more than one-half of its
value was added in a "non-reciprocating" nation, have been heavily criticized. 104 Which nations are considered non-reciprocating is subject to
change 105 leaving United States firms with uncertainty as to what equipment is safe to order in advance. Equipment without restrictions one
month may carry restraints the next, too late for American companies to
cancel their orders or to use the equipment in the United States as planned.
Furthermore, determining the ultimate source of components, as these
provisions require, may prove administratively difficult and time-consuming. Tracing the origin of equipment probably would entail the cooperation
of exporting nations reluctant to aid a process which may label their
equipment as unmarketable in the United States.
In addition, these provisions would allow restrictions to be placed on
products manufactured and sold by wholly-owned United States companies if over half the total value of the products were attributable to components from non-reciprocating nations. 106 Although aimed at foreign
nations, these provisions may injure United States firms unaware that
certain components carry an automatic penalty. Further, they present
severe administrative problems and introduce uncertainties in the international telecommunications market.
Inconsistency with United States International Obligations
Reciprocity as embodied in §§ 238 and 267 ignores several United States
international obligations. The United States, like most of its trading partners, is a member of the GATT. The GATT contains an unconditional
"most favored nation" principle ("MFN") which requires its members to
grant each other treatment equal to that accorded any other trading partner. 107 If the FCC, for example, were to restrict telecommunications imports from Japan, without applying those restrictions against all other
GATT signatories, the United States would be violating its MFN obligation toward Japan. Under the GATT, Japan may be entitled to compensation for the United States violation. 108
Second, the GATT forbids its signatories to impose restrictions on the
internal sale, distribution and use of imported goods which are not also
imposed on domestic goods, a concept known as the national treatment
principle. 109 Yet §§ 238 and 267 violate this principle by authorizing the
FCC to apply internal restrictions solely on imported goods, such as the
denial of interconnection rights.
Furthermore, GAT requires certain objective standards 11 0 or interna-
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tional procedures I I to be followed before a member can retaliate against
or remove a concession from another GATT member. Under §§ 238 and
267, the FCC is allowed to take unilateral action against GATT signatories
without regard to GATT procedures and standards. The United States may
anticipate difficulties in convincing its trading partners to comply with the
GATT if it ignores GATT principles in a new reciprocity law.
In addition to ignoring GATT obligations, §§ 238 and 267 explicitly
require the FCC to disregard existing or prospective agreements on telecommunications equipment procurement if, in the FCC's judgment, the
other nation is not in full compliance with the agreement, it allows United
States firms access under conditions which distort "research and development, investment, sales or marketing," or it condones domestic manufacturer practices which inhibit sales of United States telecommunications
facilities. 112 Under §§ 238 and 267, the FCC may effectively repudiate
United States treaties and agreements such as the Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Agreement with Japan. 113 In this agreement, Japan promised to
provide United States telecommunications firms with competitive opportunities in its procurement procedures. 114 Unilateral FCC action could
ironically result in closing the markets of foreign nations now pledged to
provide United States firms with access.

CONCLUSION
From a pragmatic as well as a legal viewpoint, §§ 238 and 267 appear faulty
and unworkable. Although definitional problems such as applying restrictions to firms 80 percent owned by United States citizens can be cured by
redrafting, major difficulties, such as provoking world-wide retaliation,
may prove insurmountable in any legislation requiring reciprocity from
United States trading partners. But with growing unemployment and a
deepening recession, pressure on Congress to act is likely to continue.
Therefore, alternatives to reciprocity and to the threat of retaliation must
be considered.
GATT Article XXII Proceedings
Article XXIII of GATT provides for compensatory measures when a nation's benefits under GAIT are "nullified and impaired." 115 The Consumers for World Trade have urged the United States to initiate GAIT Article
XXIII proceedings instead of legislating reciprocity. 116 GAIT, however,
only applies to merchandise; neither investment nor services are explicitly
covered. 117 Since investment and services are crucial to the telecommunications industry, GATT as it now stands may provide little aid to United
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States telecommunications firms. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige 118 and United States Trade Representative William Brock 119 have
advised Congress to provide the President with authority to negotiate in
the areas of services and investments. With this authority, Brock hopes the
United States can persuade its trading partners to extend the coverage of
GATT and other international agreements to services and investments as
a means of reducing trade barriers in those areas. 120
Internal Procedures of Other Nations
An alternative more likely to provide access to foreign markets than the
threat of retaliation is the use of a foreign nation's own laws. Geza
Feketekuty, Assistant United States Trade Representative for Policy Development, recently recounted one successful use of this strategy. Germany had established a telecommunications data information system for air
reservations which excluded all airlines except Lufthansa or those with
whom Lufthansa had a pooling arrangement. Since the United States antitrust laws prohibited pooling arrangements with foreign airlines, United
States firms were automatically excluded. When this practice was brought
before the German Cartel Office, the Office declared it invalid and required
the reservations system to include other airlines. 121 Mr. Feketekuty
testified that the strategy of using the internal procedures and laws of other
nations has proved successful in other cases, and urged United States
telecommunications firms to use this avenue for relief more vigorously. 122
Improve United States Economic Conditions
High interest rates in the United States have strengthened the dollar and
increased the relative prices of United States goods and services abroad. 123
If interest rates were lowered, United States products would be more
competitive with those of other nations and its trade deficit would probably decrease. This solution is limited, however, since it focuses on the trade
deficit and does not remove trade barriers within other nations.
Bilateral Agreements
United States Trade Representative Brock has expressed his hope that the
United States will conclude bilateral agreements with other nations similar
to the NTT agreement with Japan. 124 Under the NTT agreement Japan
promised to bring the procurement procedures of Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Company into conformity with the provisions of the Government Procurement Code. 125 After lengthy negotiations, Japan placed $8
billion of its government telecommunications procurement under the
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Code. Another $1.8 billion of NTT's telecommunications procurement was
placed under the NTT agreement. 126 Under that agreement Japan must
allow United States firms to bid on contracts to furnish telecommunications equipment, and all bids must be considered on a nondiscriminatory
basis.
Similarly, the United States could offer to include more American entities in the Government Procurement Code as leverage in bilateral negotiations with other nations. 127 Such negotiations are consistent with GATT
obligations and with the United States policy of trade on a mutually

beneficial basis. In the long run, contracting with other nations to reduce
their barriers in exchange for a reduction of barriers in the United States

is more likely to produce continued and amicable trade relations in the
telecommunications industry than are threats and retaliatory actions.
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